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Income Tax-CONDOMINIUM RECREATION FACILITIES-EXCESSIVE
RENTAL PAYMENTS TO OWNERS OF RECREATION FACILITIES NOT IN-
CLUDIBLE IN DEVELOPER'S SALES INCOME-Murry v. Commissioner,
601 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1979).
At times, the oft-maligned recreation facility lease is an instru-
ment for inordinate abuse and the subject of a variety of litiga-
tion.1 Murry v. Commissioner' represents the Internal Revenue
Service's most recent contribution to the cacophony of litigation.
In Murry, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (the Commis-
sioner) unsuccessfully sought to increase the taxable income of a
condominium developer by contending that a recreation facility
lease, which purchasers were required to assume from the devel-
oper as part of a sale transaction, constituted an improper diver-
sion of sales income from the developer to the lessors of the facil-
ity.3 A Fifth Circuit panel disposed of his attempt to restructure
the transaction according to its economic substance by noting that
"the Commissioner has been unable to point to any precedent sup-
porting his [desired form of restructure]."'
The factual setting in Murry is one commonly found in the con-
dominium development industry.5 In late 1964, Kenneth Murry, a
building contractor in southeast Florida, joined forces with Elias
Breath for the development of condominium apartments.' The
project was implemented through Lakeside Garden Developers,
Inc., a corporation formed and solely owned by Murry and Breath.7
1. Numerous issues have been presented in litigation relating to common facilities leases.
See, e.g., Chatham Condominium Ass'n v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1979) (alleging Sherman and Clayton Act antitrust violations); Bennett v. Behring Corp.,
466 F. Supp. 689 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (alleging fraudulent misrepresentations, unconscionability
of deed restrictions, breach of contract, and antitrust violations); Bessemer v. Gersten, 9
FLA. L.W. 106 (Feb. 29, 1980) (alleging unenforceability of lien due to violation of Florida's
constitutional Homestead Provision); Harbor Club Condominium No. Three, Inc. v. Sauder,
380 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (alleging failure to deliver quiet enjoyment of
recreation facilities and unconscionability).
2. 601 F.2d 892, 79-2 USTC 1 9565 (5th Cir. 1979). In an appendix to its opinion, the
Fifth Circuit adopted the Tax Court's memorandum opinion in Lakeside Garden Develop-
ers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 1294 (1976).
3. Brief for Appellant at 13, Murry v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 892, 79-2 USTC 9565
(5th Cir. 1979).
4. 601 F.2d at 893, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,060 (emphasis in original).
5. The Commissioner remarked that "the use of... practices such as that [sic] in ques-
tion here has [sic] been widespread among condominium developers in the state of Florida."
Reply Brief for Appellant at 8 n.5, Murry v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 892, 79-2 USTC 9565
(5th Cir. 1979).
6. Appendix for Appellant at 73-74, Murry v. Commissioner, 601 F.2d 892, 79-2 USTC
9565 (5th Cir. 1979).
7. 601 F.2d at 894, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,061. At its inception Lakeside was owned by
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In 1965, Lakeside acquired title to a parcel of land upon which
Murry and Breath planned to construct eleven apartment build-
ings and a common recreation facility. Early in the following year,
as the first building neared completion, title to the facility was
transfered to the corporation's shareholders at cost. Simultane-
ously, Lakeside, acting as the initial and sole member of the build-
ing's owners' association, entered into a ninety-nine year net lease,
for the nonexclusive use of the facility, and thereafter entered into
similar leases for each of the other owners' associations. As a con-
dition to residency at the Lakeside Point Gardens development,
each individual was required, inter alia, to pay a purchase price
that was determined by the Commissioner to be below a fair mar-
ket price for similar apartment units, become a member of the ap-
propriate owners' association, and assume a proportionate share of
the association's obligation to pay rent. As security for the rent
payments, each individual's title was encumbered by the associa-
tion's lien upon his apartment unit and all tangible personality
within. Murry and Breath in turn held liens upon the property of
the owners' associations, and in addition, appointed themselves as-
sociation officers.8
In May, 1973, the Commissioner issued ninety-day letters assess-
ing income tax deficiencies to Lakeside for the fiscal years 1966
through 1969, and to Murry and Breath for the tax years 1966
through 1968. 9 His determination was predicated upon the theory
that the amount of the rental obligation assumed by purchasers in
excess of a fair rental amount represented additional sales income
to Lakeside, and a constructive dividend from Lakeside to its
shareholders.10 Accordingly, the Commissioner evoked "traditional
assignment of income principles" and the "substance over form
rule" as the basis for increasing the taxable income of the three
taxpayers by the present value of the total excessive rent amount."
The cases of Murry and Lakeside were consolidated and
presented before the Tax Court in Miami, Florida, on December
16, 1975.12 On the Commissioner's motion, the court severed the
three individuals. Murry and Breath each held 45% of the outstanding shares while Harry
Topal held 10%. After Topal's death, Murry and Breath each assumed one-half of Topal's
interest. Id.
8. Id. at 894, 79-2 USTC 1 9565 at 88,061-62.
9. Appendix for Appellant at 12, 26.
10. 601 F.2d at 897, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,064.
11. Brief for Appellant at 15.
12. Appendix for Appellant at 59. Breath's case was settled before trial. 35 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1294 n.1 (1976).
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issue of proper valuation from the issue of whether the capitalized
excess rents could be allocated to Lakeside in the first place." Sub-
sequently, the court, considering only the allocation issue, entered
judgment for the taxpayers, noting that it found "no basis in the
law for the corrective action sought . . . by the respondent."", On
appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Commissioner reiterated his lower
court arguments in language that contained interesting antitrust
elements. This note's analysis will begin with a discussion of these
elements.
The Commissioner contended that Murry's scheme constituted a
"tying arrangement.' 1 A tying arrangement exists whenever "a
seller, having a product which buyers want (the tying product), ref-
uses to sell it alone and insists that any buyer who wants it must
also purchase another product (the tied product)."'" Under some
circumstances, it is possible for valueless products or intangible
goods to be the objects of a tying arrangement. 7 In order to pro-
vide a buyer an incentive to participate in an arrangement, how-
ever, the tying product must be offered for sale at a price below the
price it would normally command in the marketplace. A tying
product offered at its fair value cannot compete in the marketplace
with similar unemcumbered goods.' s While tying devices may come
within the antitrust proscriptions of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts, "'9 they normally present few controversies involving the tax-
able income of the taxpayer.20 It becomes far more likely that the
tax consequences will be controversial, however, in cases in which a
13. Brief for Appellant at 13.
14. 601 F.2d at 898, 79-2 USTC 1 9565 at 88,064.
15. Brief for Appellant at 12.
16. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 431 (1977).
17. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast Sys. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979)
(copyrighted music in an alleged tying arrangement); United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38
(1962) (worthless films as the tied product in a tying arrangement); Carpa, Inc. v. Ward
Foods, Inc., 536 F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1976) (restaurant trademark in a tying arrangement). An-
titrust issues were raised against a condominium developer in Buckley Towers Condomin-
ium, Inc. v. Buchwald, 533 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1976). The Buckley Towers court stated that a
tying arrangement existed in which the tying product was the condominium apartment unit
and the tied product was the obligation to make rental payments for use of a common facil-
ity. Id. at 938.
18. See generally L. SULLIVAN, note 16 supra, at 445-54.
19. Sherman Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976); Clayton Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (1976).
20. In the traditional circumstance, the total amount of income generated by a tying
arrangement will inure to a single taxpayer. For example, in International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), leasing of salt processors supplied by the appellant corporation
was tied to sale of salt from the same corporation. Id. at 398.
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corporate developer offers the tying product at a price below its
market value and, in addition, requires the "purchase" of the use
of a recreation facility owned by a third party for a "price" that
exceeds a fair market price. As the Commissioner alluded to, it is
conceivable that participants in a Murry scheme could attempt to
"treat the entire consideration [received in] the sale of apartment
units as rental income for the use of the recreational facilities."21
To shield himself against such machinations, the Commissioner
petitioned the Fifth Circuit to include the Murry leases within the
definition of gross income found in section 61(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code (the Code).22 Section 61(a) defines gross income as
"all income from whatever source derived. ' 23 Treasury Regulation
section 1.61-124 includes within this definition amounts realized in
the form of "services, meals, accommodations, stocks, or other
property, as well as . . . cash." Section 1001(b) of the Code and
related cases further require that deferred payment obligations re-
ceived in sales transactions be included in gross income in the year
of sale.25 In Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,2 a case presented
in argument by the appellant, a building was sold for a cash down
payment and an obligation to pay a fixed monthly sum over fifteen
21. Reply Brief for Appellant at 5-6. The total amount of income that the Commissioner
alleged to have been diverted to the shareholders via the tying device was $584,527.84. Ap-
pendix for Appellant at 30. Judge Tuttle's dissenting opinion notes that Lakeside reported
losses in two of the four fiscal years in question and that Murry and Breath recovered a
95.7% annual return on their investment in the recreation facility during the tax years in
question. 601 F.2d at 900, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,066.
22. The Commissioner also claimed that the provisions of I.R.C. § 482 allowed him to
allocate the value of the rent obligation to Lakeside. Section 482, as it appeared in the tax
years in question, stated that:
In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether or not
incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States, and whether or not
affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the same interests, the Sec-
retary or his delegate may distribute, apportion, or allocate gross income, deduc-
tions, credits, or allowances between or among such organizations, trades, or busi-
nesses if he determines that such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is
necessary in order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of
any such organizations, trades, or businesses.
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 1, § 482, 68A Stat. 162 (current version at I.R.C. § 482).
The opinion briefly dismissed this argument by stating that the obligation did not represent
"income" and thus was not allocable to Lakeside under § 482. 601 F.2d at 899, 79-2 USTC
9565 at 88,065.
23. I.R.C. § 61(a).
24. (1980).
25. See Caruth v. United States, 566 F.2d 901, 78-1 USTC 9204 (5th Cir. 1978); In re
Steen, 509 F.2d 1398, 75-1 USTC $ 9199 (9th Cir. 1975); Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner,
524 F.2d 788, 75-2 USTC 1 9732 (9th Cir. 1975).
26. 524 F.2d 788, 75-2 USTC 9732 (9th Cir. 1975).
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years. The Warren court held that, under section 1001(b), such an
obligation is properly characterized as income from the sale of real
estate, taxable in the year of sale, and valued at the market value,
if ascertainable.2 7 In Murry, the Commissioner's argument was
based on these principles. He asserted that the excess portion of
the rents received by the shareholders was, in effect, a deferred
payment obligation incurred by buyers as partial consideration for
the sale of condominium units, and that Murry was distinguishable
from Warren Jones largely because the proceeds from the Murry
obligations were diverted to third parties.2 8 In the Commissioner's
view, diversion to third parties was justification under Gregory v.
Helvering"9 and its progeny 0 to restructure, for tax purposes,
transactions whose forms conceal their true substance.
The Fifth Circuit majority opinion did not dispute the Commis-
sioner's right "to pierce the apparent and discover the real transac-
tion."3 1 Nevertheless, the court declared that the Murry transac-
tions were bona fide and that the Commissioner could not
restructure them simply to arrive at a more favorable tax result.32
Clearly, the court felt that the transactions fell on the permissible
side of the boundary separating form from substance.
The general rule for most form-substance controversies is that a
taxpayer must have a purpose other than mere tax avoidance
before a transaction form will be recognized. s In a dissenting opin-
ion in Gilbert v. Commissioner,3 4 Judge Learned Hand summa-
rized the form-substance issue by commenting that:
[I]f. .. the taxpayer enters into a transaction that does not ap-
preciably affect his beneficial interest except to reduce his tax,
the law will disregard it; for we cannot suppose that it was part of
the purpose of the [income tax] act to provide an escape from the
liabilities that it sought to impose .... [If, however,] a taxpayer
supposes that the transaction, in addition to its effect on his tax,
27. Id. at 793-94, 75-2 USTC T 9732 at 88,216-17.
28. Brief for Appellant at 23-24.
29. 293 U.S. 465, 35-1 USTC 9043 (1935).
30. See, e.g., Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 40-1 USTC 9160 (1940); Commissioner v.
Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 45-1 USTC 9215 (1945); United States v. General Geo-
physical Co., 296 F.2d 86, 61-2 USTC % 9698 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied 369 U.S. 849
(1962).
31. 601 F.2d at 893, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,060.
32. Id.
33. See, Blum, Motive, Intent, and Purpose in Federal Income Taxation, 34 U. CHI. L.
REV. 485, 518-24 (1966-67).
34. 248 F.2d 399, 57-2 USTC 9929 (2d Cir. 1957).
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will promote his beneficial interests in the venture, he will, of
course, secure the desired [tax] reduction .... 1
In Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Commissioner,6 a Fifth Circuit
panel allowed the restructure of a complex set of transactions it
described as "another attempt by a taxpayer to ward off tax blows
with paper armor. '37 Waterman was a corporation which agreed to
sell all of the capital stock in a wholly owned subsidiary for a cash
amount equal to its basis in the stock. Pursuant to the sale agree-
ment, however, a taxfree intercorporate dividend in the form of a
promissory note was declared by the subsidiary's board of directors
moments prior to the completion of the sale. The amount of the
promissory note was approximately equal to the taxable gain that
Waterman would have realized had it accepted the purchaser's ear-
lier cash offer of $3,500,000.38 Upon completion of the sale, the
purchaser made a loan to the subsidiary so that it would extinguish
its obligation to its former parent.3 9 After a series of transactions, a
corporation controlled by the purchaser's shareholders bought the
subsidiary's note to the purchaser, and thereafter cancelled it.40 In
holding for petitioners, the Tax Court recognized a valid purpose
for the arrangement in that the purchaser was seeking to escape
Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of the acquisition.4 1 It
further noted that in any sale of stock, the price the purchaser is
willing to pay will be reduced by the amount of any dividend paid
just prior to the closing of the sale. 2 Judge Tannenwald's dissent
stated, however, that the above rationale did not apply under these
circumstances because the subsidiary was no richer or poorer at
the completion of the sale than it had been before the promissory
note dividend was declared, and because the full amount of the
funds used for purchase had come from the purchaser just as if it
had paid by cash or by a deferred payment obligation.4' The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that, while regulatory purposes justified
the purchase of the subsidiary's stock rather than its assets, they
35. Id. at 411, 57-2 USTC 9929 at 58,334 (citations omitted).
36. 430 F.2d 1185, 70-2 USTC 9514 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971).
37. Id. at 1185, 70-2 USTC 1 9514 at 84,173.
38. Id. at 1187, 70-2 USTC 9514 at 84,174.
39. Id. at 1189-90, 70-2 USTC 9514 at 84,176.
40. 50 T.C. 650,657-58 (1968).
41. Id. at 660-61.
42. Id. at 666.
43. Id. at 667. The dissent notes that, in cases relied upon by the Tax Court majority,
the dividends were paid in cash before the sales were closed. Id. at 666-67.
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did not justify the hollow transactions entered into by the
appellees."
The circumstances in Murry are analogous to those in Water-
man. Like the subsidiary in Waterman, Lakeside was a closely
held corporation whose shareholders caused it to incur a liability
payable to them that was subsequently satisfied by a third party.""
The Commissioner contended that the Waterman obligation was,
in substance, a portion of the price paid for the stock.46 In Murry,
the Commissioner similarly asserted that the excess portion of the
obligation was actually a part of the price paid for the condomini-
ums.47 Thus, the only relevant feature distinguishing the Murry
and Waterman opinions appears to be that the exclusive purpose
for the Waterman transactions was tax avoidance,48 while in
Murry it was not.'9 This distinction may have been considered rel-
evant by the court in upholding one transaction and allowing
restructure of the other. 50 Unfortunately, the opinion does not ex-
plain precisely why the outcome sought by the Commissioner was
inappropriate.
44. 430 F.2d at 1195-96, 70-2 USTC 9514 at 84,181. The opinion notes that "Water-
man's sole objective [for participating in this kind of transaction] was to receive $3,500,000
with approximately $2,800,000. . . eliminated from income. Id. at 1191, 70-2 USTC T
9514 at 84,177.
45. Although the obligation of the subsidiary in Waterman was not technically assumed
by the purchaser of the property, the purchaser provided the funds with which to pay the
obligation via a loan that he later cancelled. Waterman Steamship Co. v. Commissioner, 50
T.C. at 657-58. Although the form and intricacy of the transactions differ, the economic
reality in Murry is essentially identical to the economic reality in Waterman. In each in-
stance, the purchaser supplied funds to the seller or its controlling shareholders in conjunc-
tion with a sale of property. Moreover, the payments were essentially a portion of the
purchase price.
46. 430 F.2d at 1186, 70-2 USTC 9514 at 84,173.
47. 601 F.2d at 897, 79-2 USTC 1 9565 at 88,063.
48. 430 F.2d at 1191, 70-2 USTC 7 9514 at 84,177.
49. Apparently, Murry and Breath neither received tax advice nor engaged in any con-
sideration of taxes when contemplating the structure of their transactions. In cross-exami-
nation at trial, Murry stated that his sole purpose for selecting the particular form of his
transactions was to receive a stream of rents. Appendix for Appellant at 70.
50. Normally, the presence of a tax avoidance purpose is not dispositive of the form-
substance issue. In United States v. General Geophysical Co., 296 F.2d 86, 61-2 USTC T
9698 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 849 (1962), the court noted that the absence of a
tax avoidance motive "lend~s] support to taxpayer's case, but [does] not control the disposi-
tion of the case." Id. at 90, 61-2 USTC $ 9698 at 81,812. The court further noted that
"[i]ntent often is relevant in questions of taxation . . . but in most cases tax treatment
depends on what was done, not why it was done." Id. Thus, the absence of a tax motive in
Murry will not justify the outcome unless the court also found another purpose. Judge
Quealy's opinion in Murry states that the transactions were bona fide, but does not identify
the purpose that made them so.
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Instead, the Murry opinion presents two arguments that are in-
apposite to the proposition asserted by the Commissioner. First,
the opinion, relying upon Willow Terrace Development Co. v.
Commissioner,51 asserted that when "the developer does not dedi-
cate [the recreation] facilities to the exclusive use of the property
owners, but instead elects to make the facilities a commercial ven-
ture in and of itself, the cost of the facilities does not become part
of the basis of each property sold. '52 In Willow Terrace, the cost of
common water and sewage facilities was properly includable in the
developer's basis in a subdivision, because the developer had not
retained control of the facilities and had not intended to operate
them as a profitable independent investment.53 Because Murry re-
tained full control over his facilities and intended to operate them
at a profit, their cost should properly have been excluded from
Lakeside's basis in the unsold condominiums. The Willow Terrace
case has no relevance to the issue in Murry, however, because in
Murry the Commissioner did not suggest that the basis of the fa-
cility itself should be allocated among the condominium units.5
Second, the opinion relied upon the "Maryland ground rent
cases" 55 to support the proposition that "to attempt to tax the
value of such a leasehold at the time that the lease is entered into,
or when such [a lease] is assumed by a third party, would run di-
rectly counter to what has been . . . presumably the law, since the
first revenue act."" In Estate of Simmers v. Commissioner,7 the
developer acquired unimproved land, divided it into lots, and built
houses upon it. As each group of houses neared completion, the
developer would cause a wholly owned corporation to enter into a
ninety-nine year renewable lease of the land on which the houses
stood. The ground lease was assumed by the purchaser when each
house was sold.5 8 The Commissioner characterized such perpetual
leases as a sale of the underlying land, and accordingly sought to
51. 345 F.2d 933, 65-2 USTC 9449 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965). See
also Country Club Estates, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 1283 (1954).
52. 601 F.2d at 899, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,064.
53. 345 F.2d at 939, 65-2 USTC T 9449 at 96,023.
54. Brief for Appellant at 25-26.
55. Since colonial times, it has been a common practice among developers in Maryland
to sell the improvements and lease the underlying land to the purchasers for lengthy peri-
ods. See Kaufman, The Maryland Ground Rent-Mysterious But Beneficial, 5 MD. L. REv.
1 (1940).
56. 601 F.2d at 899, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,065.
57. 23 T.C. 869 (1955), aff'd, 231 F.2d 909, 56-1 USTC 9403 (4th Cir. 1956).
58. 23 T.C. at 873.
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increase the taxable income of the developer by the present value
of the stream of payments to be received.5 The Commissioner's
characterization was rejected by the Tax Court. Instead the court
held that the house purchasers were "lessees whose leases were
subject to being avoided in the event of default in payment of the
ground rent or other items [of expense]. ' 60
Superficially the circumstances in Murry are similar to those in
Estate of Simmers. In each case, the Commissioner attempted to
include the present value of a stream of rents in the taxpayer's
current income. In Murry, however, the Commissioner did not
question the nature of the leases. Neither did he claim that the
leases were actually a sale of the leased property. Nor did he at-
tempt to allocate the present value of the entire stream of rentals
to the developer as he did in Estate of Simmers. Rather, he argued
that the rentals were far in excess of the amount that would have
been agreed upon had Lakeside and the lessors engaged in arm's
length negotiation, and that the excessive portion of the rents rep-
resented an improper diversion of sales income." Although arm's
length negotiation between the developer and the lessor corpora-
tion was similarly absent in Estate of Simmers, there was no inti-
mation in that case that any portion of the rental amount repre-
sented a diversion of part of the sale price. In Murry, the
Commissioner did not challenge the right of lessors to report rental
income throughout the duration of the lease to the extent that
such income represented a fair rental amount. Instead, he sought
to prevent the diversion of sums of money from the developer to
its shareholders in a stream of small periodic payments as a device
to avoid taxes. The propositions presented by the Fifth Circuit did
not address the excess rent issue in Murry.
Why did the court reject the excess rentals theory? Apparently,
the court found a purpose that made the Murry transactions bona
fide."2 Although it is unfortunate that neither the Fifth Circuit
opinion nor the Tax Court memorandum opinion by Judge Quealy
explain what this purpose might have been, another excess rent
59. Id. at 876.
60. Id. at 878. See also Welsh Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 391, 60-2 USTC T
9498 (4th Cir. 1960) (addressing the allocation of basis issue under circumstances in which a
developer sold houses and retained ownership of the underlying land).
61. Brief for Appellant at 20-22.
62. The opinion describes the Commissioner's position as an attempt to restructure "ac-
tual transactions . . . into different transactions so that more immediately taxable income
would result." 601 F.2d at 893, 79-2 USTC 9565 at 88,060.
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opinion by Judge Quealy hints at its nature.
The Tax Court decided the excess rental issue once again in
Friedman v. Commissioner," a case in which the facts were sub-
stantially similar to those in Murry. Although the Friedman opin-
iorr did not differ from the Murry opinion with regard to the excess
rental issue, it provided a better exposition of the purpose that
supported the transactions. The opinion noted that in the mid-
1960's the condominium concept was new in the Florida market
and that the early developments had to divert a portion of each
unit's sale price into a stream of rental payments to successfully
compete with the existing rental housing market. By using such
devices, the amount of financing purchasers had to acquire could
be reduced so that their monthly payment would approximate
monthly rentals paid for similar apartments." The presence of this
competitive necessity justifies accepting the form of the transac-
tion for tax purposes.
Furthermore, there is a second possible reason supporting the
pro-taxpayer outcome in Murry. It is conceivable that the court
simply chose to apply judicial restraint in an effort to limit litiga-
tion over new issues that would have been raised by a contrary
decision.65 Had the Commissioner prevailed in Murry, for example,
the opinion would have created uncertain tax consequences for
purchasers of condominium units used for the production of in-
come. It is unclear whether such a purchaser could continue to de-
duct the entire rent expense periodically or would be required to
capitalize a portion of it as part of the purchase price and claim
depreciation deductions. Similarly, issues would have been raised
relating to purchasers ejected for nonpayment of rent. Would the
basis to such a purchaser include the present value of the full
stream of excess rent or would it be adjusted at his ejectment to
reflect only those excess payments that he actually made? Indeed,
it is unclear whether any purchaser would be allowed to include
any of the excess payments in his basis in the first place. Such
issues can be more appropriately raised and resolved through con-
gressional enactment than by a Fifth Circuit opinion.
Nevertheless, although the outcome in Murry is a proper exer-
cise of judicial conservatism, it creates an anomalous consequence.
63. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 841 (1976). See also Mangurian v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M.
(CCH) 366 (1978) (dealing with the excess rental issue and the proper valuation issue).
64. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) at 850.
65. The opinion noted that there was a "total dearth of authority supporting the Com-
missioner's position." 601 F.2d at 893, 79-2 USTC T 9565 at 88,060.
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The effect of the Murry opinion is to permit the diversion of cor-
porate income to the shareholders free from dividend taxation via
tying devices. Assuming that the leases had an ascertainable mar-
ket value, it is unlikely that Congress intended to allow such tax
avoidance when it enacted sections 61 and 1001. Furthermore,
while the employment of such devices may have been necessary in
the southeast Florida condominium market during the late-1960's,
it is uncertain whether it is currently necessary in Florida, whether
it is necessary in other regions, and whether courts will ever allow
diversion of amounts greater than those necessary for competitive
purposes. Consequently, it is hoped that the Murry decision will
receive a narrow application in future excess rental litigation.
JORGE E. ALVAREZ

